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Are auditor disclosed materiality thresholds informative of firms’ earnings quality? – 
Evidence from the revised ISA 700 audit report 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Under the Financial Reporting Council’s presumption that mandating new disclosure requirement 
in the audit report would provide information useful to investors, we examine whether the auditor 
disclosed materiality threshold is associated with the firm’s earnings quality. We document that a 
lower threshold of materiality level is associated with a higher earnings quality, as measured by 
lower discretionary accruals, higher accruals quality, and less earnings smoothing. We also find 
some evidence that the negative association between auditor disclosed materiality threshold and 
earnings quality is more pronounced when the auditor is more independent, when management’s 
incentive to manage earnings is higher, and when there is lower information uncertainty. Overall, 
our results are useful to investors who rely on the new audit report disclosures to gain insights into 
the audit process and more importantly to infer the quality of the firm’s reported earnings. Our 
results could also be relevant to regulators, such as the PCAOB and IAASB, who are 
contemplating whether to impose similar materiality threshold disclosure requirements in audit 
reports. 
 
Key words: Materiality threshold, audit report, earnings quality
 1 
 
Are auditor disclosed materiality thresholds informative of firms’ earnings quality? – 
Evidence from the revised ISA 700 audit report 
 
Introduction 
Materiality is an important concept in auditing work, and is also an area of particular interest 
to investors given its potential impact on the scope of an audit and the evaluation of audit findings. 
In response to increasing investors’ demands for more information on a firm’s auditing process, 
the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) recently revised International Standards on Auditing (UK 
and Ireland) 700 (ISA 700) to require auditors to report how they applied the concept of materiality 
in performing the audit and how this affected the scope of their audits. The new standard is 
effective for audits of financial statements for periods commencing on or after 1 October 2012. 
The revised ISA 700 represents the first time that risk assessment and materiality planning in the 
audit process will be incorporated in the audit report. Hence, for the first time, we are able to 
examine the informativeness of auditor disclosed materiality thresholds in the new audit report.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that users of the audit report would find the materiality threshold 
information useful in assessing the quality of the audit. For example, in the consultation paper 
“Requiring the auditor’s report to address risks of material misstatement, materiality and a 
summary of the audit scope” (FRC 2013a), a UK asset manager commented: “We firmly believe 
that there should be a greater focus on auditing judgments in the auditor’s report – issues about 
which it is appropriate for the auditor to make initial disclosures. By auditing judgments, we mean 
a disclosure of … the materiality threshold, both overall and in terms of performance materiality. 
All of these are vital insights into the quality of the audit and enable investors to assess the value 
they are getting for the money they are paying for the audit, as well as providing a helpful basis 
for dialogue between investors and those charged with governance.” In the same consultation paper, 
the FRC also highlighted that “investors believe that the auditor’s report could usefully provide a 
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platform of information about the audit which they could use as a basis for engagement about the 
audit. The proposed information about the auditor’s assessment of risks and materiality and how 
the scope of the audit was responsive to these assessments would make the company-specific 
application of the auditing standards more transparent.” Hence, the FRC’s underlying presumption 
in mandating this new disclosure requirement is that the disclosed materiality threshold will be 
informative about the quality of the audit, and by extension, the earnings quality of the financial 
statements. The objective of this study is to shed light on this presumption by examining whether 
the disclosed materiality threshold is associated with the firm’s earnings quality.  
A priori, it is not clear how the auditor disclosed materiality threshold is associated with the 
firm’s earnings quality. On the one hand, a low material threshold results in a greater likelihood 
that an error detected will be deemed as material by the auditors. Consequently, the auditor needs 
to perform more work and procedures to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements 
are not materially misstated. As a result of more extensive audit procedures that are performed, 
and combined with a lower tolerable misstatement, the likelihood of detecting accounting errors 
increases and more accounting errors are likely to be corrected. Furthermore, the disclosure of 
materiality threshold can increase scrutiny from investors, and hence auditors’ accountability with 
respect to quantitative materiality assessment under the revised ISA 700. The increased 
accountability can in turn lead auditors to expend greater audit effort or become more conservative 
in their audit judgements (Hoffman and Patton 1997; Asare et al. 2000; DeZoort et al. 2006). As 
such, they may be less willing to tolerate a major misstatement that exceeds the threshold (i.e., 
allow waiver of misstatement adjustment) because this can increase the likelihood of a challenge 
by investors that the auditor fails to require management to correct the misstatement when a 
restatement occurs subsequently. Based on the above arguments, we should expect a lower auditor 
 3 
 
materiality threshold to be associated with a higher earnings quality.  
On the other hand, standard setters have opted to view materiality as a matter of professional 
judgment and stress the importance of both qualitative and quantitative materiality considerations 
(Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99). Hence, even when the auditor discloses a materiality 
threshold, the auditor still has the discretion to waive a major misstatement that exceeds the 
disclosed quantitative threshold on the grounds that the misstatement is immaterial based on 
qualitative factors, especially when the auditor is not fully independent and caters to management’s 
financial reporting pressures. Furthermore, the disclosure of quantitative materiality threshold 
could have the countervailing effect of reducing the litigation risk of the auditor, and hence their 
inclination to rely strictly on quantitative materiality threshold in their misstatement adjustment 
decisions (Jennings et al. 1991; Doxey 2013).1 To the extent that auditor’s legal liability is reduced 
when they disclose explicit quantitative materiality thresholds, we expect auditors to be more 
willing to tolerate material misstatements that exceeds the threshold and allow waiver of such 
misstatements. Consequently, we may not observe a lower auditor materiality threshold to be 
associated with higher earnings quality. 
We empirically test the link between disclosed auditor materiality threshold and earnings 
quality based on 432 firm-year observations for UK premium listed firms over 2013 and 2014. We 
directly measure auditors’ threshold of materiality by hand-collecting the monetary value of the 
materiality threshold reported by the auditor in the audit report. We find that a lower threshold of 
materiality level is associated with a higher earnings quality, as measured by lower discretionary 
                                                             
1 For example, Jennings et al. (1991) examine the effect of disclosing quantitative materiality thresholds on judges’ 
assessments of auditor liability for uncorrected misstatements in an experimental setting. They find that adding 
language to the auditor’s report that listed an explicit materiality threshold (e.g., 10% of net income) significantly 
reduced the judges’ liability judgments against the auditors, even when the auditors found the error but fail to disclose 
it. 
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accruals, higher accruals quality, and less earnings smoothing. This result is robust to the control 
of auditor fixed effects to capture inherent differences in audit practices across different auditors. 
It is also robust to the inclusion of industry and time fixed effects to control for across industry and 
over time variation in earnings quality. 
Finally, we conduct a series of cross-sectional tests and find that the negative association 
between auditor disclosed materiality threshold and earning quality is stronger when auditor 
independence is higher and when managers’ incentives to manage earnings is higher. These results 
suggest that when the economic dependence on the client is high, the auditor could be more tolerant 
towards the client’s opportunistic behavior and less likely to use quantitative materiality thresholds 
assessments to curtail aggressive manager choices. In addition, when managers have stronger 
incentives to manage earnings, the likelihood of potential misstatement increases and hence 
auditors are likely to be more conservative in evaluating materiality decisions and use quantitative 
materiality thresholds to curb earnings management. Finally, we find that the negative association 
between auditor disclosed materiality threshold and earning quality is weaker when information 
uncertainty is higher. This result suggests that when there is greater information uncertainty about 
accounting estimates, auditors are less likely to deem a misstatement as being sufficiently material 
to require an audit adjustment and therefore more likely to waive such adjustments. Consequently, 
the materiality threshold becomes less informative about the quality of the audit and hence the 
firm’s earnings quality.  
This paper makes several important and novel contributions. First, the new audit report as 
required by the revised ISA 700 auditing standards reflects the UK accounting standard setter’s 
expectation that disclosure of the auditor’s materiality threshold will better enable financial 
statement users to assess the reliability of the financial statements and the quality of the audit. To 
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the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to comprehensively examine the link between 
materiality threshold and firm’s earnings quality. The results in this study would be relevant and 
important to investors who rely on the auditors’ materiality threshold to gain insights into the audit 
process and more importantly to infer the quality of the firm’s reported earnings. Our results could 
also be useful to regulators, such as the PCAOB and IAASB, who are contemplating whether to 
impose similar materiality threshold disclosure requirements in audit reports.  
Second, most prior studies that examine how the auditors’ materiality thresholds affect 
audit outcomes are conducted using experimental data (e.g., Libby and Kinney 2000; Ng and Tan 
2003, 2007), surveys (e.g., Nelson et al. 2002, 2003), or limited archival data (Wright and Wright 
1997; Keune and Johnstone 2012). Our study is able to rely on the publicly disclosed materiality 
threshold in the revised audit report to directly test the link between materiality thresholds and 
earnings quality, thus complementing and increasing the generalizability of the results documented 
in prior studies.  
Finally, prior studies examining the link between auditing and earnings quality generally 
focused on auditor attributes such as auditor size, industry specialization, auditor tenure, and non-
audit fees (DeFond and Zhang 2014). In contrast, there is limited archival evidence documenting 
the audit process, primarily due to data limitations. In their review of the recent archival audit 
research, DeFond and Zhang (2014) call for more archival research on the black box of the audit 
process using creative settings and research designs in light of the data limitations (p.304). 
Recently, studies begin to examine how the auditing process influences audit quality using novel 
settings. For example, Lennox et al. (2016) examine how year-end audit adjustments are related to 
earnings quality using proprietary data from China. Given that the materiality threshold is an 
important part of the auditor’s risk assessment and planning process, our study responds to DeFond 
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and Zhang’s (2014) call for more archival research into the audit process and thus extends and 
contributes to this line of literature. 
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research methodology. Section 
4 presents the primary analyses and Section 5 presents the additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
2.1 Background of ISA 700 (Revised) 
The Financial Crisis of 2008 heightened investors’ and other stakeholders’ concerns about 
the reliability of financial reporting and how the audit process can be enhanced to increase the 
usefulness of financial statements. In particular, investors and other users of financial statements 
have criticized that the current “pass/fail” model of the audit report provides little information on 
the audit process and how the auditor addressed the risks of material misstatements. In response, 
the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) introduced new requirements for auditor’s reports on 
companies with effect for periods commencing on or after 1 October 2012. Specifically, ISA (UK 
and Ireland) 700 (Revised) (“ISA 700”) requires auditors to include within their audit reports (a) a 
description of those assessed risks of material misstatement that were identified by the auditor and 
which had the greatest effect on the overall audit strategy; the allocation of resources in the audit; 
and directing the efforts of the engagement team; (b) an explanation of how the auditor applied the 
concept of materiality; and (c) a summary of the audit scope, including an explanation of how the 
scope was responsive to the assessed risks of material misstatement described in (a) and the applied  
materiality as described in (b). 
Even before ISA 700 was revised, financial statement users have repeatedly called for 
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auditors to disclose quantitative materiality thresholds in the audit report (e.g., Mock et al. 2013; 
PCAOB 2011a, 2011b; IAASB 2011; Carcello et al. 2011; IAASB 2012). Although there was no 
such requirement for auditors, ISA (UK and Ireland) 320 (“ISA 320”) “establishes standards and 
provide[s] guidance on the concept of materiality” (FRC 2009, p. 2). Along with the disclosure of 
auditor’s materiality thresholds under the new ISA 700, the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) have 
issued proposals to call for similar requirements (IAASB 2013; PCAOB 2013). For instance, in 
June 2011, the PCAOB issued a Concept Release on Possible Revisions to PCAOB Standards 
Related to Reports on Audited Financial Statements (PCAOB 2011a). The concept release 
proposed four potential changes to audit reporting, including the addition of an “Auditor’s 
Discussion and Analysis” (AD&A) section to the audit report that would allow the auditor to 
discuss, among others, materiality levels. In May 2011, the IAASB issued the Consultation Paper 
“Enhancing The Value Of Auditor Reporting: Exploring Options For Change” to solicit views 
among users of financial statements on whether including the level of materiality applied by the 
auditor during the audit engagement in the standard auditor’s report would provide useful 
information about the audit.  
Concurrent studies examine the effects of the new audit report requirements under ISA 700. 
For instance, Reid et al. (2015a) find that abnormal trading volume significantly increased 
following the implementation of the new disclosure regime, and that abnormal trading volume 
increased more for companies with weaker information environments. Reid et al. (2015b) find that 
although audit fees marginally increased after the reporting changes, the increase is not 
significantly different from the fee increase documented in the prior year, which suggests a 
possible time trend of increasing fees unrelated to the new reporting requirements.  
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Gutierrez et al. (2016) find that the new report resulted in a pre-post adoption increment in 
audit fees of approximately seven percent for adopter companies, compared to non-adopter 
companies. However, they do not find evidence that the new report had an immediate one-year 
effect on audit quality or investors’ reaction. Lennox et al. (2017) find that the valuation 
coefficients on earnings and net assets are smaller for companies where auditors report a greater 
number of risks of material misstatement, consistent with the new disclosures reliably 
communicating the uncertainty in accounting measurements. However, inconsistent with the 
disclosures being incrementally informative, they find that the valuation coefficients are not 
significantly different in the year that the new audit reports become publicly available as compared 
with the prior year. 
Most relevant to this paper, two studies examine the disclosure of materiality thresholds in 
the audit report. Amiram et al. (2017) find that the firm’s reliance on debt financing and the extent 
of insider shareholding are associated with lower auditor materiality thresholds. In addition, they 
also find that the difference between the earnings multiples of high and low materiality threshold 
firms decreases after the disclosure of the thresholds, consistent with low materiality threshold 
firms benefiting from the disclosure that auditors apply a more stringent threshold, and hence 
improving the perceived relative reliability of their financial statements. Gutierrez et al. (2016), in 
a supplementary analysis, find that materiality is positively associated with absolute discretionary 
accruals, suggesting that comparatively smaller materiality is associated with higher audit quality. 
However, their study only examines one measure of earnings quality, and they only examine the 
immediate one-year effect of the new regulation. We provide more comprehensive evidence on 
whether the disclosed materiality thresholds are informative about three proxies of earnings quality 
and how this relation is moderated by auditor independence, management incentives to manage 
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earnings, and the firm’s information uncertainty.  
2.2 Hypothesis Development  
The FASB, in Financial Accounting Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of 
Accounting information, defined materiality as "the magnitude of an omission or misstatement of 
accounting information that, in light of surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that the 
judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information would have been changed or 
influenced by the omission or misstatement." At the planning phase of an audit, the auditor decides 
on the overall magnitude of materiality (“planning materiality”) that is used to plan and define the 
scope of the audit. In determining the amount of planning materiality, the auditor considers the 
company’s earnings and other relevant factors such as the nature and complexity of the business. 
The auditor then “allocate” a portion of the planning materiality to account balances or classes of 
transaction to determine the amount of tolerable misstatement “for purposes of assessing the risks 
of material misstatement and planning and performing audit procedures at the account or 
disclosure level” (AS No. 11). The tolerable misstatement represents the materiality threshold 
below which misstatements can occur and not be considered material.  
When errors or misstatements are detected during the course of the audit, the auditor will 
compare the amount of these misstatements with the tolerable materiality threshold to determine 
if they are material. In considering whether a misstatement is material, the auditor may also 
consider qualitative characteristics of the misstatement (SAB No. 99). If the detected misstatement 
is deemed to be material enough to require adjustment of the client’s books, the auditor informs 
the client management and the audit committee of the misstatement, and these parties must reach 
agreement about whether managers are required to correct the misstatements prior to issuing the 
financial statements. Managers may be waived from correcting misstatements if the auditor and 
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audit committee conclude that the misstatements do not render the financial statements materially 
incorrect. The ultimate decision to book or waive adjustment is influenced by managers’ incentives, 
auditors’ incentives, and audit committee characteristics (Keune and Johnstone 2012). 
Because of the importance of materiality on the scope and effectiveness of an audit, the 
FRC proposed that the materiality threshold of an audit be disclosed in the audit report so that 
users can assess the reliability of the financial statements and the quality of the audit. For instance, 
the revised ISA 700 (para 19B) states that “the explanations of the matters required to be set out 
in the auditor’s report by paragraph 19A (which includes assessed risks of material misstatement, 
the auditor’s application of the concept of materiality, and the scope of the audit) shall be described 
so as to enable a user to understand their significance in the context of the audit of the financial 
statements as a whole and not as discrete opinions on separate elements of the financial statements.” 
In the consultation paper “Requiring the auditor’s report to address risks of material misstatement, 
materiality and a summary of the audit scope” (FRC 2013b, para 11), the FRC opines that 
shareholders and other users of financial statements may derive considerable benefit from being 
provided with information about the auditor’s assessment of materiality. Hence, the FRC’s 
underlying presumption is that the disclosed materiality threshold will be informative about the 
quality of the audit, and by extension, the earnings quality of the financial statements. Our study 
sheds light on this presumption by examining whether the disclosed materiality threshold is 
associated with earnings quality. 
We posit that lower disclosed materiality threshold in the revised ISA 700 is associated 
with higher earnings quality. First, a low level of material threshold results in greater likelihood 
that an error detected will be deemed as material by the auditors. Consequently, the auditor needs 
to perform more work and procedures to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements 
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are not materially misstated. As a result of more extensive audit performed, and combined with a 
lower tolerable misstatement, the likelihood of detecting accounting errors increases and more 
accounting errors are likely to be corrected. Hence, there are fewer accounting errors remaining in 
the financial statements and the risk of material misstatement decreases. Further, prior studies 
document that the misstatement amount relative to the planning materiality threshold is an 
important factor in the auditor’s decision whether to book or waive detected misstatements 
(Icerman and Hillison 1991; Wright and Wright 1997). Therefore, we expect earnings quality to 
be higher when disclosed materiality threshold is lower.  
Second, the disclosure of materiality threshold can increase scrutiny from investors, and 
hence auditors’ accountability with respect to quantitative materiality assessment under the revised 
ISA 700. Supporting this notion of increased accountability from disclosure, Carcello and Li (2013) 
find that the requirement for the engagement partner to sign on the audit report increases the 
partner’s accountability. Reid et al. (2015b) argue that the enhanced disclosures by auditors in the 
new audit report will increase the transparency of the audit work performed and hence increase the 
accountability of the auditors to stakeholders. The increased accountability can in turn lead 
auditors to expend greater audit effort or become more conservative in their audit judgements 
(Hoffman and Patton 1997; Asare et al. 2000; DeZoort et al. 2006).2 When auditors disclose their 
quantitative materiality threshold in the audit report, they may be less willing to tolerate a major 
misstatement that exceeds the threshold (i.e., allow waiver of misstatement adjustment) because 
this can increase the likelihood of a challenge by investors that the auditor fails to require 
                                                             
2 For example, Hoffman and Patton (1997) find that accountability led to more conservative fraud risk judgments. 
Asare et al. (2000) find, in an experimental setting, that accountability increases the breadth and nature of the work 
performed by auditors, which the authors associate with better performance. More related to our study, DeZoort et al. 
(2006) find that auditors under higher levels of accountability pressure (i.e., justification pressure, feedback pressure) 
were more conservative and less variable in their materiality judgments than auditors under lower levels of pressure 
(i.e., anonymity, review pressure). 
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management to correct the misstatement when a restatement occurs subsequently. Consistent with 
this notion, Deloitte commented the following in their comment letter to the revised ISA 700 
(Deloitte 2013): 
 
“Reporting of the overall threshold used by the auditor is likely to reduce the circumstances in 
which a classification error that is larger than planning materiality (after revision) can be 
determined to be immaterial (paragraph A15 of ISA (UK and Ireland) 450), even where this does 
not affect key ratios or other metrics of interest to shareholders. The risk of subsequent challenge 
would be too great for an auditor to accept this situation. Reporting of the threshold used for the 
reporting of unadjusted differences to the audit committee will result in there being no such 
unadjusted differences. As shareholders may well ask the CFO and/or audit committee chair at the 
AGM to confirm whether or not there were any such differences, the CFO will be driven to book 
them. This may be appropriate for factual errors, but for an extrapolated error close to the threshold 
it may be less so.” 
 
Therefore, to the extent that the disclosed quantitative materiality thresholds make auditors 
more careful and conservative in their materiality judgments and less likely to waive misstatement 
adjustments, we conjecture a lower disclosed materiality threshold to result in more misstatements 
being detected, more audit adjustments required, fewer errors, and hence higher earnings quality. 
Notwithstanding the above arguments, we may not observe earnings quality to be higher 
when disclosed materiality threshold is lower for the following reasons. First, standard setters have 
opted to view materiality as a matter of professional judgment and stress the importance of both 
qualitative and quantitative materiality considerations (SAB No. 99). For example, SAB No. 99, 
Materiality, states that auditors should not strictly rely on quantitative measures when assessing 
materiality. Rather, auditors should also consider several qualitative considerations pertinent to 
assessing the materiality of an accounting error, such as whether the error masks a change in 
earnings or other trends, hides a failure to meet Wall Street analysts’ consensus sales or earnings 
forecasts, changes a loss into profit, increases management compensation, affects compliance with 
loan covenants, contracts, or regulatory requirements, involves concealment of an unlawful 
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transaction, and whether management or the outside auditor expects that the known error may 
result in a significant positive or negative stock market reaction. This hence affords auditors with 
greater flexibility in determining whether a detected misstatement is material or not.  
There has been empirical evidence that auditors seem to apply qualitative materiality 
considerations so as to allow management to realize accounting outcome opportunistically, 
especially when the auditor is not fully independent and caters to management’s financial reporting 
pressures. For example, Libby and Kinney (2000) and Ng (2007) document that quantitatively 
immaterial earnings misstatements are less likely to be corrected if they would cause reported 
earnings to fall below analysts’ consensus forecast. Ng and Tan (2007) show that auditors are less 
likely to require correction of a quantitatively immaterial audit difference that affects the 
company’s ability to meet analysts’ consensus forecasts when the manager expresses concern 
about the adverse consequences for failing to meet earnings expectations. Hence, to the extent that 
auditor’s materiality judgements are influenced by their desire to help management achieve 
reporting objectives, auditors may still allow material misstatements to be waived even when the 
materiality threshold is publicly disclosed. In other words, auditors acquiescing to management’s 
pressure to meet or beat earnings benchmarks may garble the informativeness of disclosed 
materiality thresholds. Thus, we may not observe earnings quality to be higher when disclosed 
materiality threshold is lower as expected. 
Second, the disclosure of quantitative materiality threshold could have the countervailing 
effect of reducing the litigation risk of the auditor, and hence their inclination to rely strictly on 
quantitative materiality threshold in their misstatement adjustment decisions. As highlighted 
earlier, because regulators do not define the ideal level of materiality threshold, auditors and users 
differ substantially on their views of what constitutes a material fact (“expectation gap”). This 
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expectation gap has been partially blamed for the large number of lawsuits and judgments against 
auditors (Porter 1993). The disclosure of materiality threshold can potentially reduce this 
expectation gap and hence decrease auditor legal liability. Supporting this notion, Jennings et al. 
(1991) examine the effect of disclosing quantitative materiality thresholds on judges’ assessments 
of auditor liability for uncorrected misstatements in an experimental setting. They find that adding 
language to the auditor’s report that listed an explicit materiality threshold (e.g., 10% of net income) 
significantly reduced the judges’ liability judgments against the auditors, even when the auditors 
found the error but fail to disclose it. Doxey (2013) uses an experiment to test the effect of a 
quantitative materiality disclosure on investors’ materiality judgments. He finds that investors 
anchor their materiality judgments on the threshold explicitly disclosed by the auditor, which 
represents a qualitative and quantitative change in the determination of materiality. This, in effect, 
reduces the expectations gap between auditors and users and hence resulting in greater agreement 
with the audit report, even when uncorrected misstatements below the auditor’s threshold are 
subsequently disclosed. Therefore, to the extent that auditor’s legal liability is reduced when they 
disclose quantitative materiality thresholds, we expect auditors to be more willing to tolerate 
material misstatements that exceeds the threshold and allow waiver of such misstatements to 
acquiesce to management’s pressure. Consequently, we may not observe earnings quality to be 
higher when materiality thresholds are lower.  
Based on the above discussions, whether disclosed materiality threshold is related to 
earnings quality is ultimately an empirical question. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis 
in null form:  
H1: The auditor’s disclosed materiality threshold level under the revised ISA 700 is not associated 
with the firm’s earnings quality.  
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3. Research Methods 
3.1 Sample Selection  
Table 1 describes our sample selection process. We construct our initial sample firms from 
those companies in the London Stock Exchange Premium (“LSE”) Listing for fiscal years 2013 
and 2014. We further require that these companies are traded in the LSE main market, and are not 
in the financial industries (LSE group code 8000-8999). This procedure results in an initial sample 
of 579 firm-year observations. We then exclude 18 observations that are not covered in the 
Compustat Global, where we obtain our financial information. Next, we obtain these companies’ 
annual reports from their corporate websites or from http://www.portalchemy.com/. For each 
annual report, we manually collect the materiality-related threshold data disclosed by the auditor. 
We exclude 23 observations where the materiality threshold information is not disclosed, and 32 
observations due to missing data from Compustat Global to calculate key variables such as 
discretionary accruals. Finally, we drop 74 observations without auditor tenure data. These sample 
selection criteria lead to a final sample of 432 firm-year observations.  
 
3.2 Research Design 
To examine the association between earnings quality and auditor disclosed materiality 
amount, we run the following OLS model at firm-year level for sample firms over the years 2013 
and 2014: 
EQ_Proxyi,t = β0 + β1 ∙ logMatAmti,t + β2 ∙ Sizei,t + β3 ∙ PPEi,t + β4 ∙ Leveragei,t  
+ β5 ∙ ROAi,t + β6 ∙ MTBi,t + β7 ∙ stdCFOi,t + β8 ∙ Big4i,t 
 
 
(1) 
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   + β9 ∙ AuditTenurei,t + AuditorFE + Industry FE + Year FE + i,t 
The dependent variable EQ_Proxy denotes our measures of earnings quality. Our first measure is 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals (absDACC), which is estimated using the modified 
Jones (1991) approach as in prior literature (Carcello and Li 2013; Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et 
al. 2005; Reichelt and Wang 2010). Our second measure is accruals quality (DDAcc), which is a 
measure of accrual estimation error developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). This measure 
defines the quality of accruals as the extent to which accruals map into past, current, and future 
cash flows. Smoothing transitory cash flows can improve earnings persistence and earnings 
informativeness. However, managers attempting to conceal the real variability in their firms’ 
economic performance by smoothing reported earnings will lead to a less informative earnings 
number (Burgstahler et al. 2006). Hence, our third measure is a measure of earnings smoothness 
(Smoothness), which is the standard deviation of earnings divided by the standard deviation of 
cash flows, scaled by beginning total assets, and earnings smoothness is increasing in this measure. 
For all three measures, we multiply them by negative one so that higher values correspond to 
higher earnings quality. logMatAmt is our key variable of interest and is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the monetary value of the materiality threshold reported by the auditor in the annual 
report.  
We include several controls variables that are commonly used in prior studies of earnings 
quality (e.g., Francis et al. 2004). Sizei,t is the natural logarithm of total assets; PPEi,t is total 
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; Leveragei,t is long-term debt divided by total 
assets; ROAi,t is net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; MTBi,t is market 
value of common equity divided by the book value of equity; and stdCFOi,t is the standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations for the four years prior to year t. In addition, we include 
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several auditor characteristics that are associated with both earnings quality and the materiality 
threshold utilized. We include an indicator variable for the Big 4 auditors (Big4i,t) as a control 
because of potential differences in audit quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. We also 
include auditor tenure (AuditTenurei,t) as an additional control because of potential differences in 
audit quality for auditors with longer tenure. Additionally, we include auditor fixed effects to 
capture inherent differences in audit practices across different auditors.  
Finally, we include industry fixed effects (Industry FE) and time fixed effects (Year FE) to 
control for across industry and over time variation in earnings quality. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the final 432 firm-year observations. All 
values are measured in British Pounds. The mean (median) materiality amount is 19.33 (4.73) 
million pounds, representing an average (median) 0.7% (0.5%) of firm’s total assets. The mean 
total assets is 4,100 million pounds. On average, PPE is about 50% of total assets. The mean 
leverage ratio is 0.17, which suggests that the sample firm is not too highly leveraged. The sample 
firms are generally profitable, with a mean ROA of 0.041. The mean market-to-book ratio is 4.57 
and the mean standard deviation of CFO is 0.037. About 94% of the sample firms hire the Big 4 
audit firms as their auditors, which is not surprising given that our sample represents the largest 
firms in the UK. The average firm in our sample also retained their auditors for a long period, with 
average auditor tenure of 13.37 years. 
4.2 Regression Results 
Table 3 presents the regression results for H1 on the association between auditor materiality 
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threshold and earnings quality. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report results using the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (absDACC), the Dechow-Dichev discretionary accruals quality (DDAcc), 
and earnings smoothness (Smoothness), respectively. Column 1 shows that the coefficient on 
logMatAmt is negative and significant (t = -2.66), which provides evidence that a lower auditor 
materiality amount is associated with higher earnings quality. Thus, it appears that a lower auditor 
materiality threshold enables auditors to more effectively constrain management opportunistic 
accounting behavior, resulting in lower absolute discretionary accruals.  
Column 2 shows that the coefficient on logMatAmt is negative and significant (t = -1.92), 
which suggests that a lower auditor materiality amount is associated with a smaller unexplained 
portion of the variation in working capital accruals. Finally, Column 3 shows that the coefficient 
on logMatAmt is negative and significant (t = -2.89). To the extent that smoother earnings are a 
result of earnings management, this result suggests that a lower auditor materiality threshold is 
associated with less earnings management via income smoothing which corresponds to higher 
earnings quality. The relation between materiality threshold and earnings quality is also 
economically significant. In particular, a one standard deviation decrease in materiality amount is 
associated with a 58.4%, 29.6% and 39.4% increase in earnings quality, proxied by absDACC, 
DDAcc and Smoothness, respectively. 3  The results for the control variables are generally 
consistent with those in prior studies; firms with larger size, lower leverage, better earnings 
performance, lower cash flow volatility, and firms audited by the Big 4 auditors exhibit higher 
earnings quality. 
In sum, the results from analyses of three main measures of earnings quality suggest that the 
                                                             
3 The impact of a one standard deviation decrease in materiality amount (logMatAmt) on earnings quality, proxied by 
absDACC is computed as -0.0182 (coefficient on logMatAmt) × 1.7034 (the sample standard deviation of logMatAmt) 
÷ 0.0531 (the sample mean of absDACC) = 58.4%.  The other comparative statics are computed analogously. 
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materiality level is statistically and economically associated with a firm’s accounting quality. It 
also indicates that materiality level is a crucial input in the planning process to help auditors design 
audit procedures and make critical audit judgment.    
 
5. Additional Analyses 
5.1 Cross-Sectional Analyses 
In the main analysis, we find that a lower auditor materiality threshold level is associated with 
higher earnings quality. In this section, we examine how this relation is moderated by auditors’ 
independence, management’s incentives to manage earnings, and the firm’s information 
uncertainty.   
5.1.1 Auditors’ independence 
While prior studies have shown that auditors acquiesce to managers’ financial reporting 
demands in their materiality decisions, this is more likely to happen when the auditor has lower 
bargaining power relative to the managers (Libby and Kinney 2000; Ng 2007; Ng and Tan 2007; 
Keune and Johnstone 2012). When the economic dependence on the client is high, the auditor 
could be more tolerant towards the client’s opportunistic behavior and less likely to use materiality 
assessments to curtail aggressive manager choices. Hence, we expect the auditors to be less likely 
to deem an accounting error that is larger than the planning materiality as immaterial (and hence 
allow management to waive these errors) when they are more independent and less subject to 
management’s influence. Consequently, the negative association between auditor materiality 
threshold and firm’s earnings quality should be more pronounced when auditor independence 
increases.  
Prior studies show that a client becomes more important to the auditor and the auditor’s 
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independence is impaired when the non-audit fees are higher (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Ferguson 
et al. 2004; Gaver and Paterson 2007; Ghosh et al. 2009). Hence, our first proxy for auditor 
independence is non-audit fees as a proportion of total assets (NonAudFee/TA) (as used in 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003). In addition, there is some empirical evidence that a longer auditor tenure 
may also impair auditor independence and result in lower earnings quality (Manry et al. 2008; 
Chen et al. 2008; Chi et al. 2009). Hence, our second proxy for auditor independence is the number 
of years an audit firm is with the client (AuditTenure). We multiply both NonAudFee/TA and 
AuditTenure by negative one so that a higher value indicates greater audit independence. To 
examine how auditor independence affects the relation between materiality amount disclosed by 
the auditors and firm’s earnings quality, we re-run Equation (1) by further separately including the 
variables NonAuditFee/TA and its interaction with logMatAmt, and the variable AuditTenure and 
its interaction with logMatAmt in the regression. Table 4, Panels A and B present the regression 
results based on NonAuditFee/TA and AuditTenure, respectively.  
In Table 4 Panel A, we find that the coefficient on the interaction of logMATAmt and 
NonAuditFee/TA is significantly negative when we measure earnings quality using absolute value 
of discretionary accruals (t = -2.63) or using the unexplained portion of accruals to predict cash 
flows (t = -3.59). These results indicate that when non-audit fees are lower and hence when the 
auditor is more independent, the negative association between materiality threshold and earnings 
quality is stronger. There is no evidence of such effect when we measure earnings quality by the 
extent of earnings smoothing. Next, Table 4 Panel B shows that the coefficient on the interaction 
of logMATAmt and AuditTenure is significantly negative when we measure earnings quality using 
the unexplained portion of accruals to predict cash flows (t = -1.71). There is no evidence of such 
effect when we measure earnings quality by the absolute value of discretionary accruals or the 
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extent of earnings smoothing. Taken together, the results in Tables 4, Panels A and B provide some 
evidence that auditors are more likely to constrain earnings management using a lower materiality 
threshold when they are more independent. 
 
5.1.2 Management incentives to manage earnings 
Earlier, we argue that when materiality thresholds are disclosed in the new audit report, 
auditors are likely to be more conservative in evaluating materiality decisions and more reluctant 
to allow management to waive major misstatements or errors. Because having a stronger 
management incentive to manage earnings increases the likelihood of potential misstatement and 
errors, we expect auditors to be more careful in their materiality decisions. Hence, we expect the 
negative relation between auditor’s materiality threshold and firm’s earnings quality to be more 
pronounced when managers have stronger incentives to manage earnings.  
We utilize several proxies for the incentives to manage earnings. Managers may have greater 
incentives to manage earnings prior to a forthcoming debt financing (DebtFinancing), hence we 
examine whether the association between audit materiality amount and firm’s earning quality is 
strengthened under the circumstance of firms’ forthcoming debt issuance. Prior studies also 
suggest that there is an additional market premium to meeting or beating earnings benchmark 
consistently (e.g., Kasznik and McNichols 2002), hence managers who habitually meet or beat 
earnings benchmark have greater incentives to manage earnings to continue meeting or beating 
earnings expectations. We classify a firm as a habitual benchmark beater if it reports at least two 
years of increasing EPS in the prior three years (D_EPSIncr2). Finally, prior work suggests that 
firms have incentives to manage earnings to avoid debt covenant violations (e.g., Dichev and 
Skinner 2002) or to avoid credit ratings downgrade (Jung et al. 2013). We proxy for a firm’s debt-
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related incentives to manage earnings using the firm’s leverage ratio (Leverage). 
We then separately include DebtFinancing, D_EPSIncr2 and Leverage and their interaction 
term with audit materiality amount in model (1), and Table 5 Panels A, B and C present these 
results, respectively. In Table 5 Panel A, we find that the coefficient on the interaction of 
logMatAmt and DebtFinancing is significantly negative when we measure earnings quality using 
absolute value of discretionary accruals (t = -1.83) or using the unexplained portion of accruals to 
predict cash flows (t = -2.87). These results indicate that the association between lower materiality 
threshold and higher earnings quality is more pronounced when the firm has a forthcoming debt 
issuance. There is no evidence of such effect when we measure earnings quality by the extent of 
earnings smoothing. In Table 5 Panel B, we find that the coefficient on the interaction of 
logMatAmt and D_EPSIncr2 is significantly negative when we measure earnings quality using the 
extent of earnings smoothing (t = -2.14), which indicates that the association between lower 
materiality threshold and higher earnings quality is more pronounced when the firm is a habitual 
benchmark beater. There is no evidence of such effect when we measure earnings quality using the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals or using the unexplained portion of accruals to predict 
cash flows. Finally, in Table 5 Panel C, we find that the coefficient on the interaction of logMatAmt 
and Leverage is significantly negative when we measure earnings quality using the unexplained 
portion of accruals to predict cash flows (t = -1.94), which indicates that the association between 
lower materiality threshold and higher earnings quality is more pronounced when the firm has 
higher leverage. There is no evidence of such effect when we measure earnings quality using the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals or the extent of earnings smoothing. 
Overall, these results are consistent with our prediction that when management has greater 
incentive to manage earnings, auditors are aware of these incentives and are hence more likely to 
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strictly apply planned materiality to evaluate audit findings.  
 
5.1.3 Information Uncertainty 
 Prior literature suggests that auditors tend to have less bargaining power in negotiating the 
adjustment of accounting estimates with their clients when there is significant room for judgment 
about an accounting issue (Deis and Giroux 1992; Magee and Tseng 1990). Accordingly, when 
there is greater information uncertainty about accounting estimates, auditors are less likely to deem 
a misstatement as being material enough to require an audit adjustment and more likely to waive 
such adjustments; that is, auditors are likely to rely less on materiality thresholds to curb 
opportunistic earnings management and the disclosed materiality threshold becomes less 
informative about the earnings quality of the firm. Consequently, the negative association between 
auditor’s materiality threshold and firm’s earnings quality should be weaker when information 
uncertainty is higher. On the other hand, prior literature suggests that auditors are more 
conservative in evaluating uncertain audit evidence when the cost of audit failure is high (Patterson 
and Smith, 2003). Moreover, Griffin (2014) find that auditors are most likely to require 
adjustments when fair values contain both more input subjectivity and more outcome imprecision. 
As such, it is possible that when there is greater information uncertainty about accounting estimates, 
auditors are likely to rely more on materiality thresholds to curb opportunistic earnings 
management; that is, the negative association between auditor’s materiality threshold and firm’s 
earnings quality would be stronger when information uncertainty is higher.   
We empirically examine the ambiguous association discussed above using the average 
monthly bid-ask spread over the fiscal year (Spread) to proxy for information uncertainty and 
including Spread and its interaction term with audit materiality amount in model (1), and Table 6 
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presents the result. We find that the coefficient on the interaction of logMATAmt and Spread is 
significantly positive when we measure earnings quality using absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (t = 2.33) or using the unexplained portion of accruals to predict cash flows (t = 1.93). 
The result indicates that when information uncertainty is higher, the association between lower 
materiality threshold and higher earnings quality is weaker. There is no evidence of such effect 
when we measure earnings quality by the extent of earnings smoothing. Hence, our results provide 
some evidence that auditors rely less on materiality threshold in the course of their audit when 
information uncertainty is high, resulting in a weaker association between low materiality 
threshold and high earnings quality. 
 
5.2 Market Reaction to Disclosed Materiality Threshold 
 In a final supplementary test, we investigate whether the disclosed materiality threshold 
moderates investors’ response to earnings surprise. In particular, we expect investors to place less 
weight on earnings surprise if the disclosed materiality threshold is higher and hence investors 
perceive earnings quality to be lower. For this analysis, we estimate the following regression model: 
Reti,t+1 = β0 + β1 ∙ EPSchgi,t + β2 ∙ logMatAmti,t + β3 ∙ EPSchgi,t × logMatAmt  
+ β4 ∙ Sizei,t + β5 ∙ Leveragei,t + β6 ∙ Distressi,t + β7 ∙ MTBi,t  
+ AuditorFE + Industry FE + Year FE + i,t 
 
 
 
(2) 
The dependent variable Ret is the one-month, two-month and three-month returns cumulated three 
months after the fiscal year end to ensure that the disclosed materiality threshold are available to 
investors. We proxy for earnings surprise using the annual change in earnings per share excluding 
extraordinary items (EPSchg). We include several control variables including firm size (Size), 
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leverage (leverage), whether the firm is in financial distress (Distress), market-to-book ratio (MTB), 
and auditor, industry and year fixed effects. The results of this empirical estimation are presented 
in Table 7. 
 As observed from this table, we find that investors placed significantly less weight on earnings 
surprise when returns are proxied by one-month (t = -1.98) and two-month returns (t = --2.54), 
although the results are negative but insignificant when we examine three-month returns (t = -
1.39). Overall, the market reaction test corroborates our earlier findings that the disclosed 
materiality threshold is informative about earnings quality, and investors placed less weight on 
earnings surprise with higher disclosed materiality thresholds accordingly. This result also 
supports the UK regulators’ view that the disclosed materiality threshold will better enable 
investors to assess the reliability of the financial statements and the quality of the audit. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The revised ISA 700 issued by the Financial Reporting Council requires auditors to report how 
they applied the concept of materiality in performing the audit and how this affected the scope of 
their audits. In this study, we examine how the materiality threshold disclosed by the auditor in the 
new audit report is associated with earnings quality. Based on 432 firm-year observations for UK 
premium listed firms over 2013 and 2014, we find that a lower threshold of materiality level is 
associated with a higher earnings quality, as measured by lower discretionary accruals, higher 
accruals quality, and less earnings smoothing, and after controlling for auditor, industry and time 
fixed effects. In cross-sectional tests, we find some evidence that the negative association between 
materiality threshold and earning quality is more pronounced when the auditor is more independent, 
when management’s incentives to manage earnings are higher, and less pronounced when there is 
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higher firm’s information uncertainty. Overall, our results are consistent with our prediction that a 
low material threshold results in a greater likelihood that an error detected will be deemed as 
material by the auditors, and consequently, the more extensive audit procedures performed, 
combined with a lower tolerable misstatement, increases the likelihood of detecting accounting 
errors and these errors being corrected. The result is also consistent with the disclosure of 
materiality threshold increasing scrutiny from investors, and hence auditors’ accountability with 
respect to quantitative materiality assessment under the revised ISA 700, which in turn lead 
auditors to expend greater audit effort or become more conservative in their audit judgements. 
 To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to comprehensively examine the link 
between materiality threshold and firm’s earnings quality. Because the new audit report as required 
by the revised ISA 700 auditing standards reflects the UK accounting standard setter’s expectation 
that disclosure of the auditor’s materiality threshold will better enable financial statement users to 
assess the reliability of the financial statements and the quality of the audit, our results would be 
relevant and important to investors who rely on the auditors’ materiality threshold to gain insights 
into the audit process and more importantly to infer the quality of the firm’s reported earnings. Our 
results could also be useful to regulators, such as the PCAOB and IAASB, who are contemplating 
whether to impose similar materiality threshold disclosure requirements in audit reports. Our study 
also complement the results documented in prior studies that examine how the auditors’ materiality 
thresholds affect audit outcomes are conducted using experimental data and surveys (e.g., Libby 
and Kinney 2000; Ng and Tan 2003; Ng and Tan 2007; Nelson et al. 2002, 2003). Finally, given 
that the materiality threshold is an important part of the auditor’s risk assessment and planning 
process, our study responds to DeFond and Zhang’s (2014) call for more archival research into the 
audit process and complement Lennox et al. (2016) who examine how year-end audit adjustments 
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are related to earnings quality using proprietary data from China.  
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Appendix: Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables  
absDACC Absolute discretionary accruals, estimated based on a cross-sectional 
modified Jones model (Jones 1991) as described in Dechow et al 
(1995), multiplied by -1. The higher the value, the higher the earnings 
quality. 
DDAcc Accruals quality measure, estimated based on Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model, multiplied by -1. The higher the value, the higher the 
earnings quality. 
Smoothness -1*Earnings smoothness, measured as standard deviation of earnings 
divided by the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by beginning 
total assets, multiplied by -1. The higher the value, the higher the 
earnings quality. 
Audit Report Variables  
logMatAmt Materiality amount, measured as natural logarithm of the materiality 
threshold in million dollars disclosed by the auditors in audit reports.  
NonAudFee/TA Non-Audit fee percentage, measured as total non-audit fees divided by 
total assets disclosed in the annual report, multiplied by -1. 
AuditTenure Total number of years an audit firm is with the client, multiplied by -
1. 
Control Variables  
Size Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets at the 
end of the fiscal year. 
MTB Market-to-book ratio, measured as the market value divided by the 
book value of common equity of the firm at the end of the fiscal year. 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary items for 
the fiscal year divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Leverage Leverage ratio, measured as long-term debt at the end of the fiscal year 
divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
PPE Property, plant and equipment, measured as total PPE divided by total 
assets at the end of fiscal year. 
stdCFO Cash flow volatility, measured as the standard deviation of cash flows 
from operations during previous four years, scaled by beginning total 
assets. 
D_EPSIncr2 Indicator variable equals to one if EPS increases in at least 2 years of 
the past 3 years, and zero otherwise.  
DebtFinancing Indicator variable equals to one if book value of debt increases more 
than 3% of total assets in the following year, and zero otherwise. 
Spread Bid-Ask Spread, measured as average monthly bid-ask spread ((bid 
price – ask price)/closing price) over the fiscal year. The higher the 
value, the more uncertain information environment.  
Big4 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a big 4 auditing firm, and 
zero otherwise. 
EPSchg Change in annual EPS (excluding extraordinary items) from year t to 
 34 
 
year t-1. 
Distress Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm reports a net loss in year t, and zero 
otherwise. 
Ret1m Cumulative one-month returns starting three months after fiscal year 
end. 
Ret2m Cumulative two-month returns starting three months after fiscal year 
end. 
Ret3m Cumulative three-month returns starting three months after fiscal year 
end. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
Sample selection criteria   Firm-year obs. 
Companies in LSE premium listing, main 
market, non-financial, ordinary shares (2013 and 
2014)  579 
Less: Firms not in Compustat Global  (18) 
Less: Firms without materiality amount as 
disclosed  (23) 
Less: Firms without discretionary accruals 
measure from Jones' Model (column 1 of Table 
3)  (32) 
Less: Firms without auditor tenure data (column 
1 of Table 3)   (74) 
Final sample of firms during 2013 and 2014  432  
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Table 2 
Summary Descriptive 
(based on sample size of column 1 in Table 4) 
Variable N Mean S.D. 0.25 Mdn 0.75 
Dependent variables       
absDACC 432 0.0531 0.0662 0.0137 0.0339 0.0649 
DDAcc 377 0.0339 0.0321 0.0127 0.023 0.0436 
Smoothness 432 1.4012 1.1312 0.6716 1.0352 1.7543 
              
       
Control variables       
logMatAmt 432 1.4957 1.7034 0.3365 1.5546 2.6391 
TotalAssets(million) 432 4100 10000 250 840 2900 
Size 432 6.7183 1.8575 5.52 6.7302 7.9774 
PPE 432 0.4991 0.3909 0.1665 0.3929 0.7773 
Leverage 432 0.1739 0.1714 0.0071 0.146 0.2708 
ROA 432 0.0408 0.1033 0.0203 0.0509 0.0873 
MTB 432 4.5718 15.4203 1.4605 2.3406 4.2994 
stdCFO 432 0.0374 0.035 0.0161 0.0279 0.0446 
EarnVol 432 0.048 0.0567 0.0184 0.0333 0.0584 
DebtFinancing 417 0.0216 0.1455 0 0 0 
D_EPSIncr2 432 0.6968 0.4602 0 1 1 
Spread 426 0.0108 0.0216 0.001 0.0022 0.0093 
Big4 432 0.9375 0.2423 1 1 1 
NonAudFee/TA 428 0.0006 0.0013 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 
AuditTenure 432 13.3681 11.8948 6 11 17 
EPSchg 427 -0.052 0.3665 -0.0961 0.0053 0.0727 
Ret1m 427 0.013 0.0858 -0.0343 0.006 0.0516 
Ret2m 427 0.0193 0.1112 -0.0525 0.0136 0.0766 
Ret3m 427 -0.0036 0.1307 -0.092 -0.0041 0.0791 
Distress 432 0.1713 0.3772 0 0 1 
*All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%     
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Table 3 
Earnings Quality and Level of Materiality Disclosed in Audit Report 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  absDACC DDAcc Smoothness 
logMatAmt -0.0182*** -0.0059* -0.3236*** 
 (-2.66) (-1.92) (-2.89) 
Size 0.0174*** 0.0088*** 0.2793** 
 (2.60) (3.10) (2.48) 
PPE 0.0043 0.0059 0.0970 
 (0.39) (1.12) (0.50) 
Leverage -0.0574** -0.0183 -0.9096** 
 (-2.49) (-1.60) (-2.47) 
ROA 0.3091*** 0.0179 3.1595*** 
 (4.16) (1.10) (4.59) 
MTB 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0041 
 (1.17) (-0.70) (1.39) 
stdCFO -0.6100*** -0.3517*** 7.9715*** 
 (-3.71) (-5.44) (2.94) 
Big4 0.0390** 0.0011 0.3887 
 (2.08) (0.16) (1.56) 
AuditTenure -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0077** 
 (-0.45) (-0.17) (2.15) 
Intercept -0.1429*** -0.0582*** -3.1495*** 
 (-3.78) (-3.43) (-4.75) 
    
AuditorFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
YearFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
# of Observations 432 377 432 
R2 0.481 0.395 0.386 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between material threshold and proxies of earnings 
quality. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the auditor, 
year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors controlling for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test).  
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Table 4 
Earnings Quality and Level of Materiality Disclosed—Auditor’s Independence 
Panel A: Non-audit fees 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  absDACC DDAcc Smoothness 
logMatAmt -0.0223*** -0.0080** -0.2274* 
 (-2.66) (-2.53) (-1.83) 
Size 0.0195** 0.0089*** 0.1708 
 (2.44) (2.78) (1.39) 
PPE 0.0044 0.0070 0.0540 
 (0.40) (1.30) (0.28) 
Leverage -0.0433** -0.0161 -0.7391** 
 (-2.41) (-1.28) (-2.04) 
ROA 0.3071*** 0.0071 2.8256*** 
 (3.77) (0.43) (4.02) 
MTB 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0069* 
 (0.81) (-0.83) (1.72) 
stdCFO -0.4628*** -0.2940*** 8.8309*** 
 (-3.20) (-4.75) (2.79) 
NonAudFee/TA 0.0446 0.0626*** 1.3507*** 
 (1.01) (2.82) (2.74) 
    
logMatAmt*NonAudFee/TA -0.0500*** -0.0392*** 0.1202 
 (-2.63) (-3.59) (0.51) 
Big4 0.0282* 0.0000 0.3989 
 (1.74) (0.01) (1.63) 
AuditTenure 0.0000 0.0001 0.0086** 
 (0.02) (0.43) (2.36) 
Intercept -0.1483*** -0.0575*** -2.5795*** 
 (-3.40) (-3.09) (-3.64) 
    
AuditorFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
YearFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
# of Observations 428 375 428 
R2 0.501 0.432 0.400 
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Panel B: Auditor’s tenure 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  absDACC DDAcc Smoothness 
logMatAmt -0.0171** -0.0097*** -0.3386*** 
 (-2.40) (-2.71) (-2.91) 
Size 0.0174*** 0.0089*** 0.2786** 
 (2.61) (3.11) (2.47) 
PPE 0.0048 0.0043 0.0905 
 (0.43) (0.79) (0.46) 
Leverage -0.0572** -0.0195* -0.9134** 
 (-2.48) (-1.70) (-2.48) 
ROA 0.3083*** 0.0210 3.1703*** 
 (4.16) (1.29) (4.57) 
MTB 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0041 
 (1.17) (-0.73) (1.39) 
stdCFO -0.6052*** -0.3669*** 7.9062*** 
 (-3.69) (-5.94) (2.90) 
AuditTenure -0.0000 0.0004 -0.0060 
 (-0.16) (1.21) (-1.30) 
logMatAmt*AuditTenure 0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0010 
 (0.68) (-1.71) (-0.58) 
Big4 0.0375** 0.0058 0.4095 
 (1.98) (0.84) (1.58) 
Intercept -0.1438*** -0.0564*** -3.1373*** 
 (-3.80) (-3.35) (-4.72) 
    
AuditorFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
YearFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
# of Observations 432 377 432 
R2 0.481 0.411 0.387 
This table reports the regression results of the role of auditor independence on the relation between material 
threshold and proxies of earnings quality. In Panel A, auditor independence is proxied by non-audit fees 
and in Panel B, auditor’s independence is proxied by auditor’s tenure. The detailed definitions of all 
variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the auditor, year and industry indicator variables 
are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
controlling for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 5 
Earnings Quality and Level of Materiality Disclosed—Managerial Incentives 
Panel A: Debt Financing in Following Year 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  absDACC DDAcc Smoothness 
logMatAmt -0.0200*** -0.0059* -0.3876*** 
 (-2.65) (-1.90) (-3.61) 
Size 0.0199*** 0.0089*** 0.3439*** 
 (2.66) (3.12) (3.06) 
PPE 0.0088 0.0063 0.1225 
 (0.77) (1.19) (0.66) 
Leverage -0.0590** -0.0169 -0.9194** 
 (-2.46) (-1.47) (-2.46) 
ROA 0.3327*** 0.0232 3.5278*** 
 (3.92) (1.45) (4.56) 
MTB -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0004 
 (-0.21) (-0.81) (0.14) 
stdCFO -0.6089*** -0.3529*** 7.6851*** 
 (-3.54) (-5.45) (2.95) 
DebtFinancing 0.0360 0.0250*** 0.7644** 
 (1.17) (3.03) (2.34) 
logMatAmt*DebtFinancing -0.0168* -0.0072*** -0.1696 
 (-1.83) (-2.87) (-1.63) 
Big4 0.0307 0.0002 0.3337 
 (1.62) (0.03) (1.19) 
AuditTenure -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0064* 
 (-0.35) (-0.17) (1.80) 
Intercept -0.1521*** -0.0593*** -3.4196*** 
 (-3.60) (-3.49) (-5.04) 
    
AuditorFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
YearFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
# of Observations 417 377 417 
R2 0.499 0.401 0.427 
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Panel B: Reporting Increasing EPS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  absDACC DDAcc Smoothness 
logMatAmt -0.0193*** -0.0055 -0.2628** 
 (-2.72) (-1.51) (-2.43) 
Size 0.0171** 0.0088*** 0.2806** 
 (2.56) (3.10) (2.50) 
PPE 0.0036 0.0060 0.1180 
 (0.33) (1.13) (0.60) 
Leverage -0.0585** -0.0180 -0.8944** 
 (-2.55) (-1.51) (-2.40) 
ROA 0.3088*** 0.0185 3.2726*** 
 (4.09) (1.12) (4.68) 
MTB 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0042 
 (1.07) (-0.67) (1.46) 
stdCFO -0.6017*** -0.3535*** 7.6561*** 
 (-3.67) (-5.58) (2.79) 
D_EPSIncr2 -0.0085 0.0011 0.1559 
 (-0.95) (0.19) (1.19) 
logMatAmt*EPSIncr2 0.0023 -0.0006 -0.1038** 
 (0.69) (-0.27) (-2.14) 
Big4 0.0397** 0.0010 0.3832 
 (2.15) (0.14) (1.51) 
AuditTenure -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0082** 
 (-0.47) (-0.16) (2.27) 
Intercept -0.1401*** -0.0584*** -3.2153*** 
 (-3.73) (-3.43) (-4.82) 
IndustryFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
YearFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
AuditorFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 432 377 432 
R2 0.483 0.395 0.391 
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Panel C: Leverage 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  absDACC DDAcc Smoothness 
logMatAmt -0.0217*** -0.0035 -0.3417*** 
 (-2.99) (-1.05) (-2.97) 
Size 0.0169** 0.0094*** 0.2767** 
 (2.51) (3.32) (2.46) 
PPE 0.0023 0.0067 0.0862 
 (0.21) (1.29) (0.45) 
Leverage -0.0770** 0.0016 -1.0111** 
 (-2.45) (0.10) (-2.41) 
logMatAmt*Lev 0.0207 -0.0163* 0.1079 
 (1.29) (-1.94) (0.54) 
ROA 0.3183*** 0.0131 3.2075*** 
 (4.31) (0.84) (4.62) 
MTB 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0040 
 (1.12) (-0.58) (1.36) 
stdCFO -0.5885*** -0.3429*** 8.0834*** 
 (-4.04) (-5.42) (2.96) 
Big4 0.0415** -0.0018 0.4018 
 (2.22) (-0.23) (1.60) 
AuditTenure -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0076** 
 (-0.52) (-0.00) (2.12) 
Intercept -0.1376*** -0.0636*** -3.1221*** 
 (-3.64) (-3.69) (-4.72) 
    
AuditorFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
YearFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
# of Observations 432 377 432 
R2 0.486 0.404 0.387 
This table reports the regression results of the role of managerial incentives on the relation between material 
threshold and proxies of earnings quality. In Panel A, managerial incentives are proxied by debt financing 
in the following year, in Panel B, managerial incentives are proxied by reporting increasing EPS and in 
Panel C, managerial incentives are proxied by leverage. The detailed definitions of all variables are 
provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the auditor, year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated 
for brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors controlling for 
heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed test). 
 
 
 43 
 
Table 6 
Earnings Quality and Level of Materiality Disclosed—Information Uncertainty 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  absDACC DDAcc Smoothness 
logMatAmt -0.0209*** -0.0061** -0.3261*** 
 (-2.80) (-2.00) (-2.83) 
Size 0.0214*** 0.0087*** 0.3157*** 
 (2.65) (2.95) (2.61) 
PPE 0.0049 0.0084 0.0859 
 (0.43) (1.54) (0.44) 
Leverage -0.0581*** -0.0191 -0.8739** 
 (-2.81) (-1.62) (-2.44) 
ROA 0.3325*** 0.0254 3.6914*** 
 (3.76) (1.46) (4.38) 
MTB 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0016 
 (0.12) (-0.88) (0.62) 
stdCFO -0.6180*** -0.3587*** 7.5825*** 
 (-4.22) (-5.46) (2.77) 
Spread 0.7466* 0.2385 8.9223** 
 (1.94) (1.30) (2.00) 
logMatAmt*Spread 0.3778** 0.2667* 3.1577 
 (2.33) (1.93) (1.49) 
Big4 0.0329* -0.0078 0.3874 
 (1.81) (-0.78) (1.43) 
AuditTenure -0.0000 0.0000 0.0082** 
 (-0.16) (0.24) (2.23) 
Intercept -0.1925*** -0.0650*** -3.7496*** 
 (-3.40) (-3.24) (-4.61) 
    
AuditorFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
YearFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
# of Observations 426 372 426 
R2 0.482 0.414 0.385 
This table reports the regression results of the role of information uncertainty on the relation between 
material threshold and proxies of earnings quality, where information uncertainty is proxied using bid-ask 
spread. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the auditor, 
year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors controlling for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 7 
Market Reaction to Disclosed Materiality Threshold 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Ret1m Ret2m Ret3m 
EPSchg 0.0484* 0.0477* 0.0225 
 (1.88) (1.75) (0.69) 
logMatAmt 0.0013 0.0276** 0.0249* 
 (0.15) (2.35) (1.96) 
logMatAmt*EPSchg -0.0200** -0.0209** -0.0141 
 (-1.98) (-2.54) (-1.39) 
Size -0.0027 -0.0259** -0.0301** 
 (-0.34) (-2.33) (-2.36) 
Leverage 0.0223 0.0467 0.0392 
 (0.73) (1.17) (0.88) 
Distress -0.0024 -0.0049 -0.0392* 
 (-0.16) (-0.27) (-1.86) 
MTB -0.0005** 0.0001 0.0001 
 (-1.99) (0.32) (0.20) 
Intercept 0.0148 0.1241 0.1638* 
 (0.26) (1.52) (1.73) 
AuditorFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
YearFixedEffect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 424 424 424 
R2 0.236 0.220 0.211 
This table reports the regression results of market reaction to disclosed materiality threshold. The detailed 
definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the auditor, year and industry 
indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors controlling for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
  
 
